Tag Archives: terrorism

New Terrorism Guidelines Represent Further Triumph of Lawyering and an Independent IC

“U.S. eases restrictions on keeping citizens’ data,” The Washington Post broke last night.

“U.S. Relaxes Limits on Use of Data in Terror Analysis,” now says The New York Times.

“U.S. Agencies Allowed to Keep Residents’ Data for Five Years,” says Bloomberg.

“Government Now Allowed to Store Info on Innocent Americans,” says Antiwar.com.

Let the game of telephone begin: liberties stolen; privacy over.

Yesterday, the Director of National Intelligence and Attorney General released what they call “updated guidelines designed to allow NCTC to obtain and more effectively analyze certain data in the government’s possession to better address terrorism-related threats.”

The “Guidelines for Access, Retention, Use, and Dissemination by the National Counter-terrorism Center (NCTC) of Information in Datasets Containing Non-Terrorism Information,” the DNI and Justice Department say in their press release, allow the NCTC to “better protect the nation and its allies from terrorist attacks” while “at the same time protecting privacy and civil liberties.”

The updated Guidelines, the government says, “do not provide any new authorities for the U.S. Government to collect information.”

I received a copy of the new guidelines from the DNI press office at 7:53 PM last night, but I note that the 32 page document is not readily available (as of 9 AM the day after the release) on either the DNI or Attorney General’s websites.

I don’t think there’s a conspiracy here, but I do think if you read the actual document and aren’t familiar with existing guidelines and the ifs, ands, and buts of government regulations, you could easily come away concerned.

And thus constitutes the divide, the divide between Washington and the rest of the nation, between the national security imperative and the colloquial understanding of liberty as practiced by the rest of the country.  The usual suspects of the civil liberties industry (and I don’t mean to disparage them) and the anti-government set (from gun-toters to olive-branchers) will decry; talking heads promoting public slumber will counsel calm; the media will muddle.

Meanwhile the government’s lawyers will satisfy themselves and reassure – as they did in their tortured legal justification sanctioning the summary assassination of an American citizen – that it’s all in accordance with applicable laws.  If you’ve got nothing to hide, what’s the problem?, the agents of idiocy will bellow.

The NCTC, the actual document says, “shall not access, acquire, retain, use, or disseminate United States person information solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment or monitoring the lawful exercise of other rights secured by the Constitution or other laws of the United States.”

Any information received must be reviewed to ensure that it is terrorist-related, the guideline says, that is, “based on the knowledge and experience of counterterrorism analysts as well as the facts and practical considerations of everyday life.”

It’s all pretty straightforward, except that these rules only apply to the National Counter-terrorism Center.  And they leave open possibilities – indeed the likelihood – that the national security establishment will over-reach, that an overzealous someone will bend and stretch the rules and their intent, heck, that this has already been done, is already being done, which is why new Guidelines were required.

The NCTC, the Guidelines say, receives its information from federal, state, local governments and “other sources,” “other entities,” “data providers,” none of whom are named.  Any abuses, in other words, will take place elsewhere.

As long as Washington is lost in its terror war, as long as the intelligence community remains beyond accountability, as long as lawyers justify anything as legal, what is already happening in America will continue to happen.  It isn’t a government conspiracy; it’s an American erosion occurring because we haven’t figure out yet either how to deal with the abundance of information the government feels justified to collect and analyze and we haven’t figured out how to deal with the basic criminal threat that terrorism represents.

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The Folly of Deterring Extremists

Today in Secret History:  February 7

On February 7, 2005, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz sent a memo to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld (“Don”) recommending approval of The National Defense Strategy, an annual document that, well, along with the other dozens of national security strategies and documents, unclassified and classified, basically collects dust.

I mean, if there is a national defense strategy worthy of being called a strategy, doesn’t an annual document sort of prove that there isn’t one?  An annual budget?  Absolutely.  And there used to be a day not too long ago when the Secretary of Defense actually even submitted a meaty annual report to Congress, but that has since gone by the wayside.  But I digress.

On February 7, Paul reported to Don that the draft had been through “the interagency” review and that the only objection “was State’s proposal to delete the section on “Countering Ideological Support.”

“I think we should retain it,” Wolfowitz recommended, and they did.  (An interesting aside is that in the memo from Under Secretary Douglas Feith to Wolfowitz, he actually said that State and the National Security Advisor’s staff recommended deleting the section. Wolfowitz chose just to mention State.)

So, what was so offensive about the section on counter ideological support?

The section on Countering ideological support for terrorism reads:

“The campaign to counter ideological support for terrorism may be a decades-long struggle, using all instruments of national power to:

  • Delegitimate terrorism and extremists by, e.g., eliminating state and private support for extremism.
  • Make it politically unsustainable for any country to support or condone terrorism; and
  • Support models of moderation in the Muslim world by:
    • Building stronger security ties with Muslim countries;
    • Helping change Muslim misperceptions of the United States and the West; and
    • Reinforcing the message that the Global War on Terrorism is not a war against Islam, but rather is an outgrowth of a civil war within Islam between extremists and those who oppose them.

The debate within the world of Islam between extremists and their opponents may be far more significant than the messages that non-Muslim voices transmit to Muslim audiences.

Countering the ideological appeal of the terrorist network of networks is an important means to stem the flow of recruits into the ranks of terrorist organizations. As in the Cold War, victory will come only when the ideological motivation for the terrorists’ activities has been discredited and no longer has the power to motivate streams of individuals to risk and sacrifice their lives.”

Other than encroachment on State Department’s turf – and what a wonderful job they’ve done at winning the battle of hearts and minds – the theme of extremists (versus, of course, the good moderates) triumphed as the U.S. assumption.  Hence the 2011 National Defense Strategy can continue the same line, saying that efforts to just kill terrorists “cannot be decisive and do not constitute a viable long-term strategy for combating extremism.”  The 2011 strategy suggests the “whole-of-nation” approach – one of those current Washington cheers that is supposed to convey that everything’s working – and support for “responsible states.”

“In the long run,” the 2011 strategy says, “violent ideologies are ultimately discredited and defeated when a secure population chooses to reject extremism and violence in favor of more peaceful pursuits.”

There is so much wrong with this sentence.  It continues to disconnect terrorism (whoops! violent ideologies) from U.S. and western policy and actions, and ignores that there is no such thing as a secure population in this part of the world.  But most offensive, it speaks in do-gooder terms that are unhelpful and even counterproductive as a strategy for the military.

“We will adapt deterrence principles to our efforts in countering extremists,” the 2011 Strategy announces.  We’ll influence “states and other stakeholders” and make them accountable for supporting terrorists, the document opines.  And we’ll “deny terrorists the benefits they seek.”

That’s a strategy?  Saying the United States has lost the battle of hearts and minds is a no-brainer, but it is also a perennial lament that just results in the bureaucracy developing more institutions and more paper and more websites to do better.  Ultimately though, the “ideological” and “deterrence” paradigms drag terrorism back to a Cold War model.  Terrorists do not fight because they are terrorists (i.e., communists), and that if we could just convince them to be plumbers, they’d stop fighting.  Terrorists fight because that is what they think they must do to defend Islam from the very undifferentiated monoculture that this battle seeks to create.